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Cooperation is related to dispersal patterns
in Sino-Tibetan populations
Jia-Jia Wu1, Ting Ji2, Qiao-Qiao He2, Juan Du1 & Ruth Mace1,2
There is growing recognition in both evolutionary biology and anthropology that dispersal is
key to establishing patterns of cooperation. However, some models predict that cooperation
is more likely to evolve in low dispersal (viscous) populations, while others predict that local
competition for resources inhibits cooperation. Sex-biased dispersal and extra-pair mating
may also have an effect. Using economic games in Sino-Tibetan populations with strikingly
different dispersal patterns, we measure cooperation in 36 villages in southwestern China; we
test whether social structure is associated with cooperative behaviour toward those in the
neighbourhood. We ﬁnd that social organization is associated with levels of cooperation in
public goods and dictator games and a resource dilemma; people are less cooperative
towards other villagers in communities where dispersal by both sexes is low. This supports
the view that dispersal for marriage played an important role in the evolution of large-scale
cooperation in human society.
DOI: 10.1038/ncomms9693 OPEN
1 Human Evolutionary Ecology Group, Dept. of Anthropology, UCL, 14 Taviton St, London WC1H 0BW, UK. 2 Theoretical Ecology Group, Key Laboratory of
Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 1 Beichen West Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100101, PRC.
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to R.M. (email: r.mace@ucl.ac.uk).
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | 6:8693 | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms9693 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications 1
& 2015 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.
C
ooperation beyond the family in human populations
remains an evolutionary puzzle. Kin selection and
inclusive ﬁtness theory predict that natural selection
favours cooperation in viscous populations as explained by
Hamilton 1964 and developed by others in later theoretical
models1–6, as neighbours will be more highly related to each
other in populations with low dispersal. However including
demographic and life history features of a population into the
inclusive ﬁtness models generates a contrasting prediction as low
dispersal rate could increase local competition for reproductive
resources between neighbours, and thereby inhibit the evolution
of cooperation7–11. The determinants of cooperation within the
family and within the neighbourhood may differ12. If competition
happens locally, it can outweigh the effect of the high relatedness,
so dispersal could promote cooperation among neighbours. As
migrants are less related to their neighbours, they may be selected
to be less cooperative than those who have not dispersed9.
Asymmetries in relatedness can arise from sex-biased dispersal
patterns resulting in differences in how those of different ages and
sexes cooperate within in a population13. Furthermore, recent
models predict that extra-pair mating can also have an effect on
the evolution of cooperative breeding14 and on the level of
cooperation between males in the neighbourhood15.
Human kinship structures are a traditional focus for
anthropology, as humans show highly divergent norms of
post-marital residence across cultures, sometimes even within
the same region. Female-biased dispersal at marriage is the
most common, resulting in patrilocal post-marital residence,
whereas male-biased dispersal results in matrilocal residence.
Non-dispersal of either sex results in a very rare kind of
matrilineal system where residence is described as duolocal16.
Female-biased dispersal and patrilineal descent tend to be
associated with resources that males can monopolize to attract
females17. In contrast, matrilineal descent systems tend to be
associated with matrilocal or duolocal residence, horticulture and
a lack of wealth such as livestock18. Female-biased dispersal
generates different age-associated relatedness to one’s group,
which has been argued to inﬂuence age- and sex-biased patterns
of cooperation and conﬂict19. Marriage links, arising due to pair-
bonding and the exchange of females between clans, have also
been hypothesized to play an important role in human
cooperation beyond the immediate family20,21. These latter
predictions are somewhat similar to those stemming from
evolutionary theoretical models of dispersal increasing cooperation.
In southwest China, the matrilineal groups we study (the
Mosuo, the Zhaba and a matrilineal population of Pumi) show a
rare ‘duolocal’ system where neither sex disperses. Both sexes
remain in their multigenerational, natal household, often for
life22–24, and men visit their wives or girlfriends only at night. In
these duolocal populations, male parental investment is low and it
is normal for females to raise children with their co-resident kin
and without a co-resident husband. Extra-pair mating in these
communities is thought to be higher than in the more restricted
monogamous and/or patrilineal populations in the region such as
the Han, Yi and patrilineal Pumi. The Amdo and Khampa are
considered to be patrilocal but have looser marriage bonds and
intermediate female dispersal rates (with bride and groom often
from the same natal village); they have relatively high levels of
unmarried mothers compared with patrilocal groups, who are
usually living in their natal village, and could also have
intermediate levels of extra-pair paternity. The co-existence of
societies with no dispersal for marriage, within the same region,
same language family, and following broadly similar agro-pastoral
subsistence strategies, as patrilocal cultures with high and
intermediate levels of female dispersal, provides a unique
opportunity to examine the effects of dispersal patterns on
human cooperation in a real world setting.
Here we report the results of a large, naturalistic and quasi-
experimental study using economic games played by 720 people
living in 36 villages, varying in their social organization. We can
categorize each village as being a community with either high,
intermediate or low female dispersal. Villages are natural
communities in which individuals interact repeatedly and have
the potential to cooperate with farming, childcare and in any
other domain of human life. We used multiple games: a dictator
game (DG), a one-shot public goods game (PGG) and a resource
dilemma game (RDG)25–28, and examined kinship and other
determinants of variation in cooperative behaviour within and
between communities. In these games, more cooperation is
deﬁned as giving more in the DG, contributing more in the PGG
and taking less tea in the RDG. Generated from the predictions of
theoretical models, we tested the following hypotheses: (a) lower
dispersal communities have both a higher density of kin and a
higher possibility of extra-pair mating, thus will show a higher
level of dictator giving, public goods contribution and a lower
level of resource taking; (b) alternatively, there is competition
for reproductive resources between kin, so lower dispersal
communities will show a lower level of dictator giving, public
goods contribution and higher resource taking; (c) migrants are
less cooperative in the games; (d) dispersal norms interacts with
sex and age. We ﬁnd that social organization is associated with
levels of cooperation in both public goods and dictator games and
a resource dilemma; people are less cooperative towards the other
villagers in communities where dispersal by both sexes is low.
Results
Differences in rates of female dispersal between groups. Less
than 10% of women in villages of low FD (low female dispersal)
were born outside of the village, whereas 57% of women in
villages of high FD (high female dispersal) had moved in from
another village, with medium FD (intermediate female dispersal)
villages in between these values (see Fig. 1). This makes adult
average relatedness to others in the neighbourhood highest in low
FD and lowest in high FD populations (Supplementary Fig. 1).
Males do not normally disperse in any of these groups (Fig. 1 and
Supplementary Fig. 1).
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Low FD Medium FD High FD
Dispersal norm
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 b
or
n 
in
 v
illa
ge
Female
Male
Figure 1 | Proportion of women and men born in the village they are
living in for communities of different dispersal norms. A total 9% of
women in low FD (female dispersal) villages were born outside of the
village, whereas 57% of women in high FD villages moved to another. The
proportion of males dispersing is low in all communities. The sample size
was, for low FD communities, N¼ 280, 53% male; for high FD communities
N¼ 300, 51% male; and for medium FD communities, N¼ 140, 57% male.
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Effects of sex and age and close kin in the game. Using multi-
level models, we investigate effects on cooperation of village level
variables such as dispersal norm and sex ratio in the game
(Supplementary Tables 1 and 2), while controlling for the effects
of individual level variables such as sex, age and number of close
kin in the game. Assuming selﬁshness, the rational strategy or
Nash equilibrium in a one-shot anonymous game is to give
nothing in the DG, contribute nothing in the PGG and extracting
all resources in the RDG, optimizing immediate gains. But very
few players follow those selﬁsh strategies; nearly all donate
something and very few take all the tea. It is known that in other
games where players can make donations to named individuals,
players tend to favour close kin29, so we control for the number of
close kin in the games in case that inﬂuenced donations to the
group. At the individual level (see Table 1), the number of close
kin playing in the same game has a positive effect on giving in the
DG (one more close kin attending the game makes people to give
0.5 Yuan more to the recipient), and being born in the village
signiﬁcantly increases contributions in the PGG, suggesting close
relatives do increase cooperation. However, a spouse attending
the same game has no effect. Men are more cooperative than
women in all games; signiﬁcantly so for public goods contribution
and resource taken in the RDG, and marginally signiﬁcant for
dictator giving. This sex difference is not observed in many lab-
based dictator game experiments on western undergraduate
subjects and in the lab30,31. It is interesting to note that the DG
donation, which is sometimes described as altruism rather than
cooperation, is the game that is most responsive to close kin in
the game.
Effects of dispersal norms and sex ratio in the game. At the
village level, low FD has a signiﬁcant negative association with
dictator game giving and public goods contribution (Table 1).
Figure 2 and Supplementary Table 3 shows relative average game
outcome of participants by ethnic group, controlling for sex and
age (with Supplementary Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 4
showing raw data and uncontrolled effects). People in low FD
communities (red) offer signiﬁcantly less than those in high FD
communities (green), and medium FD communities are inter-
mediate in both economic games. Low FD communities are also
more selﬁsh in terms of taking more tea. There are no signiﬁcant
interactions between dispersal norm and age, although the dis-
persal norm difference appears to derive more from men’s
behaviour rather than women’s (see Supplementary Note 1 and
Supplementary Tables 5 and 6). When there are more men in the
game, people give less to the public goods game and take more tea
from the public pool, over and above the individual effect of sex.
Even though games are anonymous, this is consistent with men
behaving as if they are signalling their cooperativeness (and
possibly also their wealth) with a higher level of donation, espe-
cially to women in high FD populations where the women are less
related to them.
We also examine whether wealth is associated with cooperative
behaviour in a sub-sample of villages where we have complete
wealth rankings, and wealth rank in the village seems not to be
important (See Supplementary Table 7). Having an occupation
(other than farmer/herder) is associated with larger contributions
in the PGG (Table 1 and Supplementary Table 7), but this effect
does not remove the signiﬁcant negative effect of low FD.
In summary, a lower dispersal rate is associated with a lower
level of cooperation in economic games. These results support
the prediction that low female dispersal increases local
competition for resources7,10,13, leading to less cooperation in
the neighbourhood. They do not support the prediction that low
dispersal resulting in high relatedness in the population promotes
cooperation. Given that mating patterns are generally less
restrictive in matrilineal systems and that these are also the low
dispersing groups, there is no support for Eliassen and
Jørgensen’s hypothesis15 that a social system with more extra-
pair mating promotes cooperation between males.
Discussion
We ﬁnd that communities with low dispersal show less
cooperation with others in the neighbourhood. Previously,
Table 1 | Estimates of control and full multilevel models for dictator game (DG) and public goods game (PGG, linear) and
resource dilemma game (RDG, Poisson).
Estimate Dictator game (N¼ 358) Public goods game (N¼ 718) Resource dilemma game (N¼ 560)
Control Full Control Full Control Full
Est Se Est Se Est Se Est Se Est Se Est Se
Intercept 5.04 0.25 5.31 0.56 5.63 0.21 6.47 0.41 0.62 0.08 0.05 0.29
Fixed effect
Age 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03
Sex 0.57 0.27 0.58 0.3 1.09 0.23 0.94 0.26 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.07
TeaFS * * 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002
Occupation 0.09 0.34 0.6 0.3 0.11 0.09
Birth place 0.04 0.35 0.55 0.29 0.01 0.09
Close kin in game 0.5 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.04
Partner in game 0.25 0.37 0.18 0.31 0.02 0.08
Low FD 0.9 0.44 0.97 0.32 0.16 0.1
medium FD 0.87 0.54 0.43 0.39 0.23 0.12
Sex ratio 0.04 0.89  1.75 0.65 1.52 0.56
Random effect
Village 1.061 1.03 0.802 0.895 0.622 0.789 0.281 0.530 0.064 0.253 0.031 0.176
Individual 5.426 2.329 5.317 2.306 8.138 2.853 8.054 2.838
VPC 16.4% 13.1% 7.1% 3.37%
Linear multilevel models were used in the DG and PGG and generalized linear multilevel models (Poisson) were used in the RDG, with response variables dictator giving in the DG, public goods
contribution in the PGG and tea taken in the RDG. The ﬁxed effect predictors used in the models are sex (male¼ 1, female¼0), age (standardized age), birth place (in village¼ 1, outside¼0), close kin in
the game (number of r¼0.5 kin attending the same game), partner in the game (partner in¼ 1, not¼0), occupation (having job other than farmer/ herder¼ 1, not ¼0), and fair share of tea (for RDG
game) as individual level variables, sex ratio (proportion of men playing in the game) and dispersal norm (High FD as reference) as village level variables. Estimates in bold are signiﬁcant at Po0.05, with
P value calculated by using Satterthwaite approximations to estimate degrees of freedom (merModLmerTest package).
*For Dictator game and public goods game, the variable Tea fair share was not included in the analysis, so the cells for the variable are empty, because only in the RDG does the fair share change as
previous players deplete the common pool resource.
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we found that duolocal females experience reproductive competi-
tion at the household level, as those that move out of group
households into neolocal households have higher fertility23.
Traditionally, fertility in the duolocal Mosuo has been quite
low32. Marriage bonds are traditionally weak or non-existent in
duolocal communities. It is possible that duolocal people are
more oriented toward cooperation within the household in this
unusual system of large, highly related households, as some of the
ethnographic literature suggests33. Wider social networks outside
the household, created partly by linking afﬁnes through marriage,
may be the basis of large-scale cooperation and these wider
networks may be more important in patrilineal systems, and for
males in general. Thus, these unusual duolocal societies, in which
dispersal for marriage does not normally occur, provide a unique
opportunity to show how low dispersal inhibits large-scale
cooperation.
Kin effects and other effects may be sensitive to the precise
ecological context of the cooperative behaviour. Some other
studies have addressed the difference in cooperative behaviour
between an individual matrilineal and patrilineal group. One
study using a dictator game (with single sex groups that were also
a bit smaller) in this area found matrilineal Mosuo men not only
give more than women, as we ﬁnd, but also more than patrilineal
Yi34. One study using a public goods game in India found
matrilineal Khasi contribute more than patriarchal Assam35, but
another study using an Ultimatum game in Africa demonstrated
that matrilineal Pimbwe give less than patrilineal Kukama36.
These studies did not report whether or not close kin were
playing in the game. A test of cooperation using economic games
in a real world setting in India found that a high number of
female kin in the village was associated with lower contributions
in a PGG28. This also suggests that dispersal might enhance
cooperation but it is not tested explicitly. These studies only used
one group to represent social organization and did not consider
dispersal patterns explicitly. Some lab studies, often using western
college students as subjects, ﬁnd no sex effect or ﬁnd females tend
to give more than males30,31, but such studies are not really
informative on the effects of ecological context. Thus differences
might arise due to differences in experimental and subjects’
characteristics, such as differences in age, family members and sex
ratio in the group playing, which variables were controlled for in
the analyses, ecological context and smaller sample sizes.
Although many economic games have been criticized as
subject to framing, lack of external validity, lack of context and
other difﬁculties in interpretation37–39, they can provide a
controlled means of comparing cooperative relationships in real
communities, and as such can potentially reveal different social
norms in different social organizations40–42. Our study design
minimizes confounds by comparing many communities within
one language family and within a relatively small geographical
region, with similar ecology, environment and social conventions,
using the same research team with identical experimental
procedure and protocol, and providing enough replicates at
individual, as well as community level to enable multilevel
analysis to investigate sources of variation both within and
between communities with different social organizations. The
results of our study reveal that, although players may strategically
adjust their cooperative level upward if close kin are in the game,
in communities with low dispersal rates, we see less rather than
more cooperative behaviour beyond the immediate family. This
supports the broader notion that dispersal for marriage may be a
key factor in establishing large-scale cooperation in human
societies.
Methods
Population studied. We conducted this research in Lugu Lake, Dawu, Sichuan
Province and Maqu, Gansu Province, Southwest China in 2013 and 2014. We used
a quasi-experimental design, making use of strikingly different dispersal rates
arising from different kinship patterns in seven ethnic populations: patrilocal
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Figure 2 | Relative average individual donations in the DG and the PGG
and tea taken in the RDG for different ethnic groups. Using linear
regression for DG (N¼ 360) (a) and PGG (N¼ 720) (b) and Poisson
regression for RDG (N¼ 561) (c) controlled for age and sex, with
patrilocal-Pumi (PumiP) as reference. Each bar represents the value relative
to the patrilocal-Pumi with age and sex controlled for. Green bars, high FD;
blue bars ﬁlled with dots, medium FD; red bars ﬁlled with backslash, low FD.
Error bars indicate the standard error from the mean. Note that high values
in the RDG game denote selﬁshness (taking more tea from the public pot),
whereas low values indicate selﬁshness (less dictator giving and public
goods contribution) in the PGG and DG.
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groups with high female dispersal, where most female move to their husbands’
village after marriage; duolocal groups with low female dispersal, where both men
and women stay in their natal house throughout their life (the details of duolocal
residence are described elsewhere22,23,43); ambilocal groups with intermediate
female dispersal, where husband and wife live together but the bride is often also
from the same natal village (and/or returns to her natal village after divorce, which
is quite common in these communities). Each dispersal norm included villages
from two or three ethnic group populations: high FD groups were agricultural Yi,
Han and patrilocal Pumi living around Lugu Lake on the border of Yunnan and
Sichuan Province; medium FD groups were Amdo pastoralists living in Maqu,
Gansu Province and agricultural Khampa in Dawu, Sichuan Province; low FD
groups were agro-pastoral Zhaba living in Dawu, Sichuan Province24, agricultural
Mosuo and a duolocal population of Pumi in Lugu Lake16.
Games. We carried out games in 36 different villages, each game involving
20 residents who would potentially interact with each other in the daily life of that
village. At each village, we gathered the 20 adult participants randomly from
neighbourhood. The sex ratio averaged 50:50 but varied between villages due to the
availability of people at each game session, enabling us to examine whether
behaviour correlates with sex ratio in the game. Once the player group was
assembled, we gave an explanation of the procedure of the games in front of all the
participants. Then each individual was told the instructions again and played the
games in private, without knowing which of the 20 individuals they were matched
with in the PGG or DG. When the session ﬁnished, each participant received an
envelope with all his or her earnings in cash from the games, on average 32 Yuan
for 1 h, which is about half of 1 day’s wage in that area.
A game session consisted of a standard anonymous dictator game25, with half
the participants dictators and half recipients, with the dictators asked to divide
10 Yuan between themselves and an anonymous recipient; a standard anonymous
one-shot public goods game26,27, where the 20 participants were randomly divided
into ﬁve anonymous groups of four, with a multiplier of 2 added for the
contributions to the pot; and a resource dilemma game28 where each participant
withdrew tea packets from a public pool, unless the pool had already been
exhausted by earlier players (see Supplementary Methods for protocols, which were
similar to those used in ref. 28). The essential difference between these games is
that the PGG involves some expectation of how cooperatively others will behave in
contributing to the public pool, as their contribution will inﬂuence the return,
whereas the dictator game is just a donation (with no expectation of any returns
from the recipient), and the resource dilemma game is a decision regarding how
much to deplete a common resource.
Demographic data. Demographic data were collected after the games through a
questionnaire that included basic individual information such as name, sex, age,
animal sign, ethnic group, marital status, post-marital residence, birth place,
number of adults and children in the household and occupation; and kinship
information on number of close kin (including parents, sibling and adult children)
alive and living in the village, and the number of close kin and spouse playing in
the game session.
Statistics. We used multilevel models to analyse the game outcomes at the village
and individual levels in our nested data (720 individuals within 36 villages) for
dictator game, public goods game and resource dilemma game separately. We
estimated linear models with a normal error distribution in the DG and PGG, and
generalized linear models with a Poisson error distribution and a log link function
in the RDG. The response variables in the models were the dictator giving in the
DG, public goods contribution in the PGG and the tea taken in the RDG. The full
model had individual-level predictor domain, including sex and age as control,
occupation, birth place and kin and spouse in the game as kinship predictors, and
village-level predictor domain, including dispersal norm and sex ratio in each
village, while village was treated as a random effect to control for the variances
in different villages. Age was standardized to a normal score with a mean of zero
and unit variance. Tea fair share was included as an individual variable in the
models of the RDG to control for the variance of tea depleting rate. The analysis
was carried out using the statistical computation system R 3.0.3 (ref. 44),
including lme4 and LmerTest Packages, and P value was estimated by using
Satterthwaite approximations45. Multilevel models are recommended for
estimating standard errors in samples of cluster numbers in the range used
in this study46,47. All the models controlled for age and sex. We compared the
control and full models by using an information criteria-based approach
(Supplementary Table 8)48,49.
The research was approved by the Research Ethics Committee at University
College London and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, and informed
consent obtained from all the participants.
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